Failure to meet long-term UK carbon reduction targets – a systematic assessment by Strachan, N & Usher, W
FAILURE TO MEET LONG‐TERM UK CARBON REDUCTION 
TARGETS – A SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT 
Neil Strachan and Will Usher 
UCL Energy Institute, University College London, UK.  
Tel +44 2031085995, Email n.strachan@ucl.ac.uk  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Long term decarbonisation of the energy system is an integral part of the UK 
Government’s strategy for the environment, energy and economy. The UK was 
the first G20 country to legislate [1] a greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction targets (of 
at least -34% by 2020 and -80% by 2050, relative to a 1990 baseline). A range of 
policy mechanisms [2] are now in place to put the UK on a path to meeting this 
target – an immense challenge that requires at least a  fifteen fold reduction in 
emissions per unit of GDP. Figure 1 illustrates this challenge assuming a illustrative 
domestic UK carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions target of -80% and a projected GDP 
annual growth rate of 2.2%. 
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Figure 1: Indexed UK GP, CO2 and CO2 intensity growth rates 
 
However, as the rhetoric on long-term CO2 targets becomes ever tougher, there 
is widespread concern that these targets will be achieved. Although the UK is one 
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of the few countries on track to meet its Kyoto GHG target of -12.5% (relative to 
1990), and now may achieve a domestic target of -20% of CO2 (again to relative 
to 1990), this has only been achieved by long term structural reform (the move 
from coal to natural gas fired power generation) and the recent financial crisis 
and recession, rather than the remit of UK energy and environmental policy.  
Looking forward to the stringent 2050 targets, there is widespread scepticism of 
achieving this target. For example a recent poll of UK energy experts [3], they 
were asked them firstly what was  technically and economically feasible in terms 
of UK CO2 reductions by 2050 and secondly what their prediction that these 
reductions would be. Although 56% though that an 80% CO2 reduction was 
feasible by 2050, only 9% through this would happen. Of even more concern, 
following a set of presentations outlining the key findings of the UKERC Energy 
2050 multi-disciplinary study [4] of UK energy futures [4] these ratios fell to 43% and 
7% respectively. 
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Figure 2: Expert opinions (2009) on possible and predicted reductions in 2050 UK 
CO2 emissions 
 
This paper investigates this dichotomy between the UK policy priority in reducing 
energy-related CO2 emissions, and concerns over the feasibility, costs and 
achievability in meeting this unprecedented change in energy production and 
use. Section 2 reviews the literature on long term energy modelling and scenarios, 
noting the sparse nature of investigation of failure to meeting emissions targets. 
Section 3 outlines a set of failure scenarios and their implementation in variants of 
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the UK MARKAL model. Section 4 presents preliminary results and section 5 
discusses conclusions and ongoing work. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Few energy economists and modellers like investigating failure. Firstly there are 
comparatively very few energy-economic studies of very deep long term 
emission reductions [5], with the majority of studies being shorter term with less 
stringent targets. Secondly, most modelling and studies that do investigate such 
futures [e.g., 6,7,8] assume that this extreme exogenous constraint is met and then 
investigate technological pathways, behavioural measures, costs, and 
uncertainties in meeting this target.  A final exemplar is in the long term MARKAL 
modelling – under conditions of optimality, rational behaviour, competitive 
markets and information provision – that has underpinned UK government policy  
analysis of stringent CO2 reduction targets [e.g., 9,10].  
Scenario analysis of catastrophic failure is also not generally a popular subject 
choice, often viewed as defeatist or pessimistic [11].  In a meta analysis of UK and 
international scenarios [12], a common element was the imposition of an 
exogenous CO2 constraint and the use of a “back-casting” process to investigate 
technological pathways, behavioural measures, costs, and uncertainties in 
meeting this target.  This assumes that the CO2 target will be met, notwithstanding 
the unprecedented scale of largely decarbonising the entire UK energy system. In 
scenario typologies, such back-casting studies that assume goals are met and 
that do not consider failure are categorised as normative transformational [13].  
However, challenging the existing and prescriptive world view can be extremely 
constructive [14]. Scenarios (and modelling) that break the assumption of 
meeting CO2 targets can firstly challenge the consensus that implicitly exists 
around meeting targets, and secondly, identify protective and proactive 
strategies to anticipate failure to meet CO2 targets from external and internal 
actors and drivers respectively. This is particularly important for the UK, as a 
moderate sized economy it is a price takes for a range of international drivers on 
its energy system which are set by a range of external actors. 
3. METHODS 
3.1. Model overview 
To systematically investigate failure to achieve long-term CO2 targets, this paper 
utilises the UK MARKAL model – the same model that has underpinned the UK 
evidence base on long-term technology pathways, energy demands changes 
and costs [9]. This partial equilibrium optimisation model maximises discounted 
 3
economic welfare, taking into account evolving costs and characteristics of 
resources, infrastructures, technologies, energy service demands, behavioural 
price response and a range of taxes and policy mechanisms.  
UK MARKAL is calibrated in its base year (2000) to data within 1% of actual 
resource supplies, energy consumption, electricity output, installed technology 
capacity and CO2 emissions. The model then solves from year 2000-2050 in 5-year 
increments. All prices are in £(2000).  Table 1 details key assumptions for this study 
Key 
parameter 
Description 
Conversio
n factors 
GDP deflators: (2000 = 100), 2005 = 116.9, 2008 = 123.9 (Source: 
www.berr.gov.uk/files/file41491.pdf)  
Exchange rates: $/£ = 1.8, €/£ = 1.4 (Source: 
www.hmrc.gov.uk/exrate/usa.htm)  
Physical: 1 MTOE = 11.6 TWhr = 48.9 PJ 
Discount 
and hurdle 
rates 
Global discount rate of 3.5% (www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/data_greenbook_index.htm) 
Hurdle rates are implemented on conservation in residential and commercial 
sectors (12.5%); and transport technologies (10% for public transport, 10% for 
hydrogen private transport, 7.5% for battery and methanol private transport) 
Carbon 
Target 
2050 target of -90% (59.3MtCO2) relative to 1990 emissions of 592.4MtCO2. Equal 
annual reduction from 2020 target of 380.2MtCO2 (35.8% reduction from 1990 levels) 
Oil 4.12 9.35 6.41 6.87 7.33 7.79 8.25 8.25 
Gas 1.93 4.47 4.47 4.85 5.16 5.47 5.70 5.70 
Fossil Fuel 
Price 2000-
2050 
(2000£/GJ) 
Central 
case 
Coal 0.91 2.97 2.23 1.62 1.62 1.62 1.62 1.62 
Oil 4.12 9.35 4.58 5.31 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 
Gas 1.93 4.47 2.62 2.70 2.70 2.77 2.77 2.77 
Fossil Fuel 
Price 2000-
2050 
(2000£/GJ) 
Low case 
Coal 0.91 2.97 1.62 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
Biomass 
Imports 
Import constraint (increasing geometrically to 1260PJ by 2050) 
Energy 
service 
demand 
elasticities 
25% maximum reduction. Own price elasticity range from 0.25 to 0.61 dependent 
on specific ESD 
Policy 
variables 
and 
energy 
taxes 
As of 2008 Energy Bill [20]. Note, no EU-ETS price in reference case 
Technolog
ies 
As in [16,19] with additions including biomass CCS, infrastructure costs by scale and 
distance, additional district heat/CHP options, increased CCS costs and 
efficiencies, restricted capacity (30%) of residential heat pumps and night storage 
Table 1: Key study model assumptions 
For further detail, a comprehensive description of the UK model, its assumptions, 
applications and core insights can be found in the model documentation [16] as 
peer reviewed papers [17, 18, 19]. 
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As a perfect foresight model that assumes optimal behaviour, complete 
information, no market barriers and competitive energy markets, UK MARKAL 
represents a ‘best-case’ for the achievability and a lower bound for the costs of 
long-term energy policies. Systematically relaxing these assumptions explores the 
space between optimal solutions and the achievable pathways for such stringent 
CO2 targets. 
3.2. Definition of ‘failure scenarios’ 
In the discussion on failure scenarios (sections 4 and 5), the following definitions of 
a “failed scenario” are utilised: 
 Does not meet CO2 reduction targets (in practice the model backstop 
emissions reductions option (£5,000/tCO2) is triggered in order that the model 
still solves) 
 Meets CO2 target but still at excessive costs – both marginal price (price of 
fuels) and welfare loss  
 Meets CO2 target but with reliance on uncertain model elements with little 
empirical basis 
 
In identifying the drivers of potential failure scenarios, of most interest are cross-
cutting common mode failures that impact across the energy system. Table 2 lists 
five categories of common mode failures, the actors involved and a summary of 
initial model implementation. The initial results and discussion focus on the first two 
elements – build rates and resource imports 
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Cross-
Cutting 
Issue 
Principal 
Actor 
Description Initial model implementation 
Build times UK 
government; 
industry; 
society 
Engineering capability for the UK to 
build plant. Available financing. 
Planning regime.  Public opposition 
to construction/operation.  
Build rates on large capital 
investments – coal, gas, CCS 
plants, wind (on- off-shore), 
nuclear, marine (tidal & 
wave), distributed generation.  
Build rates  per technology 
class are: 
• until 2030 - 1GW pa  
• from 2030 - 2GW pa 
Resource 
imports 
External 
(global driver) 
Access and cost of the UK to 
conventional and unconventional 
resource imports (fossil fuels, 
uranium, biomass, electricity, 
hydrogen) 
Zero availability on biomass 
and hydrogen imports; 
lowered fossil fuel prices (see 
Table 1) 
Innovation External 
(global 
driver), UK 
government 
Ability of technologies to reach 
commercial production and 
compete with existing technologies 
with or without support/regulatory 
regimes 
[Not discussed in this paper] 
Cost increase and/or 
unavailability of key 
technologies 
Human 
factors 
Society Behaviour of individuals and 
response to pricing, information 
and regulation. Alternate 
underlying demographics and 
lifestyle issues. Altered social norms.  
[Not discussed in this paper] 
Removal of demand response 
to prices; restriction on 
conservation options. 
Alternate reference energy 
service demands 
Carbon 
price 
UK 
Government; 
external, 
society 
Delay in imposition and/or ceiling 
in acceptable CO2 price, based on 
stalled international negotiation or 
through fear of political cost 
[Not discussed in this paper] 
Carbon prices delayed and/or 
limited in scope or value. 
Table 2: Summary of initial set of common model failures 
 
4. RESULTS  
In an initial set of results, the focus is on a CO2 reduction of 90% in 2050, reflecting 
the additional role of CO2 emissions outside the UK energy system (e.g. bunker 
fuels) and the retention of non-CO2 GHGs in agriculture and other sectors. 
It is important to note there is a generic capacity for scenario failure in all models, 
through potentially unrealistic outputs generated by that model. For example, 
Figure 3 illustrates the annual investments in the UK power sector (current size 
84GW) in an optimal UK MARKAL run with no build rate constraints. As new 
vintages of plants become available (via global R&D, global learning rates and 
international supply chains), and as CO2 targets tighten (leading to an expansion 
of zero emission power production. Peak installation rates for nuclear are 4.4GW in 
2030, for cofiring CCS (negative emission) are 3.7GW in 2040 and conventional 
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gas plant (back-up) are 3.5GW in 2045 By comparison, in the 1990s “dash-for-
gas”, the build rate of well understood, modular CCGT peaked at only 2.5GW.  It 
is a very open question as to whether available finance, technical expertise, and 
grid management protocols will be able to deliver this level of investment in new 
technologies. 
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Figure 3: Unconstrained annual build rates (GW) in the power sector under a CO2-
90% case 
 
Focusing on the cross cutting modes for failure scenarios, the remaining outputs 
are for combinations of imposed build rates and imported fuel restrictions. Build 
rates on large capital investments – coal, gas, CCS (carbon capture and storage) 
plants, wind (on- off-shore), nuclear, marine (tidal & wave), distributed 
generation.  Build rates  per technology class are (until 2030) 1GW pa, and (from 
2030) 2GW pa. Given the role of international drivers on the UK, especially if major 
developing countries undertake stringent emission reduction and reduce their 
demand for conventional fuels whilst increasing demand on low carbon 
resources and fuels. Hence this is implemented as combinations of lowered fossil 
fuel prices (see Table 1), zero availability of sustainable biomass imports, and zero 
availability of hydrogen imports. Comparing to a reference case with no carbon 
constraint, the model runs are given in Table 3. 
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Scenario name CO2 
constraint 
by 2050 
Build rates 
imposed 
Fossil fuel 
prices 
Biomass 
imports 
Hydrogen 
imports 
REF No Yes Central Yes Yes 
C90 Yes Yes Central Yes Yes 
C90-LF Yes Yes Low Yes Yes 
C90-LFB Yes Yes Low No Yes 
C90-LFBH Yes Yes Low No No 
Table 3: Build rate and import constraint combination scenarios 
 
It is unsurprising that meeting a 90% reduction in UK CO2 emission produces a 
radically different portfolio of technologies, infrastructure and behaviour change, 
as seen in comparing the REF to C90 scenario’s primary energy (table 4). A major 
component of this change is the C90 scenario is the deployment of cofiring CCS 
and biomass CCS (table 6). This ensures that the power sector produces negative 
emissions to enable to UK to meet its overall CO2 constraint, and facilitates 
residual emissions in industrial and transport sectors (table 5). The impact of lower 
fossil fuel import prices (C90-LF) further increases the role of biomass CCS to 
enable additional (cheaper) natural gas consumption. This dependence of the 
untried energy supply chain of bio-cofiring CCS and pure biomass CCS 
represented one potential cause of these scenarios to fail. 
Without bio-imports (C90-LFB), the model cannot utilise this energy vector and 
adjusts accordingly. Final and primary energy are reduced further (from an 
already optimised and price responsive system). This finding relies on the response 
of consumers to prices and their willingness to pay upfront costs for energy 
conservation, both of which are problematic to predict over such long time 
scales. A range of alternate technology options include a massive growth in 
nuclear and wind capacity, with associated issues in public acceptance and 
electric grid stability. Finally esoteric options are chosen including liquid hydrogen 
imports, which exist in the model as a mitigation option but whose costs and 
practicalities are (at best) estimates derived from similar technologies and 
infrastructures. If one removed hydrogen imports (C90-LFBH), then the model 
switches to other highly uncertain options (advanced wave, solar PV, additional 
wind sites and additional bio and waste CHP; table 6). These scenarios, and their 
capacity to fail reinforces the danger in relying on an optimal deterministic 
scenario that is reliant on embryonic energy supply options or fundamental 
changes in the use of energy services. 
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  REF C90 C90-LF C90-LFB C90-LFBH 
Renewable 
electricity  216 393 347 672 911 
Biomass and waste 195 1,660 1,645 735 735 
Natural Gas 1,853 499 738 442 442 
Oil 1,029 558 562 441 441 
Refined oil 238 238 238 190 190 
Coal 4,379 2,603 2,537 91 477 
Nuclear electricity 184 2,807 2,737 4,517 4,517 
Imported electricity 8 45 44 96 97 
Hydrogen - - - 382 - 
Total 8,101 8,803 8,848 7,566 7,810 
Table 4: Primary energy in 2050 (PJ) 
 
  REF C90 C90-LF C90-LFB 
C90-
LFBH 
Upstream 6.3 2.8 3.1 2.3 2.3 
Agriculture 3.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Electricity 326.4 - 26.2 - 28.8 - 10.6 - 9.9 
Hydrogen 34.6 0.2 2.0 0 0 
Industry 83.0 23.6 23.8 21.1 21.1 
Residential 44.2 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.2 
Services 20.6 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.2 
Transport 33.1 18.1 18.3 12.8 12.8 
Other Emissions 40.9 35.4 35.4 28.7 28.0 
Total 592.5 59.3 59.3 59.3 59.3 
Table 5: Sectoral CO2 emissions in 2050 (MtCO2) 
 
  REF C90 C90-LF C90-LFB C90-LFBH 
Coal 1,198.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cofiring 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cofiring CCS 0.0 1,317.7 1,284.1 43.7 239.7 
Coal CCS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Gas 13.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Gas CCS 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 
Biomass CCS 0.0 128.6 162.2 114.2 81.4 
Nuclear 58.8 898.3 876.0 1,445.3 1,445.3 
Oil 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Hydro 14.8 31.2 31.2 40.6 40.6 
Wind 137.5 239.8 194.5 510.0 554.5 
Bio and waste 
(CHP) 210.8 136.0 120.7 128.2 168.0 
Imports 7.8 45.3 44.2 96.4 97.1 
Marine 63.7 121.7 121.7 121.7 238.2 
Solar PV 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 77.7 
Storage 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.6 4.6 
Total 1,705 2,919 2,835 2,505 2,947 
Share of renewable 25% 23% 22% 37% 39% 
Table 6: Electricity generation in 2050 (PJ) 
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In terms of costs, the most restrictive scenarios (C90-LFB, C90-LFBH) essentially fail, 
and would not solve without the existence of a placeholder backstop technology 
at the very high price of £5000/tCO2 (Table 7). This suggest that the role of 
imported sustainable biomass for the UK is critical if it is to meet stringent CO2 
targets. Without access to this energy resource, the UK requires technology, price 
or behavioural options that are currently not in this model formulation, for 
example access to emission credit purchases or a step change in energy service 
demands.  
Some scenario assumptions can benefit the UK, such as lowered global fossil fuel 
prices (due to declining global demand) that in the medium term at least 
outweigh the welfare costs of decarbonisation (Figure 4). However this effect is 
short-lived and by 2050 UK welfare losses range from £23.8 billion to £58.7 billion. 
Although these annual amounts should be taken in context of an overall UK 
economy that should be three times larger than its current size (to around £3 
trillion), this is still a very significant cost and could cause this scenario to fail due to 
societal and business opposition. 
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REF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C90 0 0 0 48 38 105 103 130 180 248 288 
C90-LF 0 0 0 48 41 112 146 168 219 286 304 
C90-LFB 
0 0 0 51 39 112 153 195 302 519 
500
0 
C90-LFBH 
0 0 0 50 40 109 149 193 300 579 
500
0 
Table 7: Marginal CO2 price (£/tCO2) 
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Figure 4: Annual welfare costs (£ billion) 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND ONGING WORK 
This exploratory analysis on the potential failure to meet long-term UK CO2 targets 
highlights the dichotomy between the UK policy priority in reducing energy-
related CO2 emissions, and the concerns over the feasibility, costs and 
achievability in meeting this unprecedented change in energy production and 
use. Despite this potential contradiction, there are very few energy-economic or 
scenario studies of deep long term emission reductions where the target is not 
met. 
By focusing on common mode failures and modelling the long-term impacts, it is 
relatively easy to trigger the failure criteria: that there is no viable solution, that the 
solution is deemed too expensive, or that the solution is based on one or more 
embryonic supply options or fundamental changes in energy service demands. In 
the limited number of scenarios discussed here, key uncertainties have included 
biomass CCS energy vectors. Further restrictions on the model solution results in a 
dependence on multiple uncertain energy options, including deep demand 
reductions that query the ability to retain energy services (e.g. home heating 
levels), an expanded power sector dominated by nuclear and wind, the cost-
effective use of imported hydrogen in transport modes, and the maturity of 
advanced wave technologies. The availability of sustainable biomass imports is a 
key element to meet stringent CO2 reduction targets. Even with a portfolio of 
these – and other esoteric options – further constrained scenarios either solve at 
prohibitively high costs or fail to solve at all. 
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Ongoing work in this area of failure to meet carbon targets will explore a wider 
range of interrelated common mode failures. Further efforts will develop better 
criteria for the definition of failure. Finally  a stochastic programming variant of the 
UK MARKAL model will be used to relax the assumption of perfect foresight and 
hence further investigate intertemporal uncertainties. This will generate further 
insights into the causes and implications of failure to meet long-term CO2 
reduction targets and hence aid in the development of iterative policy making. 
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